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CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 
Introduction 
For grain producers to maximize profits, the marketing of corn and 
soybeans is and should be just as important as efficient production. 
Why is it then that some producers do not use all the marketing tools 
available to them? Are producers aware of the price differences for 
commodities throughout Iowa and do they take advantage of the higher 
prices offered through some marketing alternatives? For example, why 
is it Iowa corn can vary $.35 or more per bushel and soybeans $ . 60 or 
more per bushel from one area to another within the state? Even within 
a price reporti ng district corn prices have varied as much as $ . 15 per 
bushel and soybeans $ .45 per bushel. Do farmers understand the different 
marketing methods and outlets available to them? 
Marketing of grain is important since it can lead to higher 
profits. It can best be explained by using an example of a farmer in 
the north central pricing district with 300 acres of cropland on which 
he raises 150 acres of corn and 150 acres of soybeans . If the soybeans 
averaged 40 bushels per acre and corn 100 bushels per acre then he 
would have 6000 bushels of soybeans and 15,000 bushels of corn to 
market. 
During 1977, t he price of corn at the elevators in the north 
central pricing district varied from $1 . 43 to $2.35 per bushel and 
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soybeans varied from a low of $4.58 per bushel to a high of $10 .22 per 
bushel . Hypothetically, if a producer had marketed all of his crops at 
the low prices, the gross receipts would have been $48,930. If, however, 
he had marketed the corn and soybeans at the top prices his revenue 
would have been $96,570 , nearly twice that of the low price. One can 
readily see the importance of marketing. 
Three alternative marketing methods that will be analyzed in this 
discussion are: cash selling, forward pricing, and hedging or contrac-
ting on the futures market. The latter two marketing tools can be used 
to separate the pr icing decision from the time of harvest or the time 
of delivery of grain to the elevator and can be used to take advantage 
of favorable prices that might develop before the producer i s ready to 
--- physically market crops . 
Basis and marketing alternatives 
An important concept in understanding v~rious marketing methods 
is the term "basis". The basis is "the difference between the cash 
price at any particular location and the price of a designated contract" 
(19, p . 15). If December corn at the Chicago Board of Trade is $2.75 
and the cash price is $2 . 25 at a Des Moines elevator, the local Des 
Moines basis i s $ . 50 under t he futures market . The basis can either be 
uncer or over the futures market. If the basis is $ .10 over the futures, 
the local cash price is $.10 higher than the near term futures price . 
The basis can change daily and differu from location to location. 
Knowing the basis patterns, composition , and why the basis can change 
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will greatly aid in evaluating pri cing opportunities in cash marketing, 
forward contracting at country elevators, and grain pricing alt ernatives 
available through the futures markets. 
Objectives 
To assist Iowa producers and elevator managers in more effectively 
marketing grain, this paper is directed toward developing information 
on actual grain basis patterns and the delivery cost basis for the North 
Central Iowa price reporting district. This paper will also include an 
examination of price relationships between Chicago Board of Trade (CBT) 
and MidAmerica (MidAm) corn and soybean futures contracts . Chicago 
Board of Trade contracts are 5,000 bushel units while MidAmerica con-
tracts are 1,000 bushels in size and provide additional flexibility for 
producers in spreading out marketings to reduce price or production 
risks. 
Specific objectives of the project are as follows: 
1. Determine the delivery cost basis for corn and soybeans for 
three representative locations within the North Central Iowa 
price reporting district. The corn delivery cost basis will 
be computed for both Chicago and St . Louis delivery to determine 
which location would be the logical futures delivery point from 
the North Centra l I owa price r eporting district . 
2. Compute the actual weekly basis on cash prices of the North 
Central price reporting district for the 1974-1978 marketing 
years which run from October 1 through September 30. 
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3. Compare the actual weekly corn and soybean basis for 1974 
through 1977 marketing years with the delivery cost basis 
for the north central Iowa pricing district. 
4. Analyze corn and soybean basis changes and potential gross 
returns from storage hedges placed at harvest and lifted during 
the summer months. 
5. Compute the weekly basis reflected in new-crop corn and soybeans 
cash contracting prices for harvest delivery during the summer 
of 1977 and compare these basis patterns with the actual basis 
that resulted during the 1977 harvest season. The summer of 
1976 was the first time new-crop contracting prices for harvest 
delivery were reported in official price reports from the Iowa 
Department of Agriculture. These comparisons should indicate 
the e.xtent to which basis uncertainty affected new-crop contrac-
ting prices during the summer. 
6. Compare corn and soybean futures prices on the Mid.America 
Commodity Exchange with those on the Chicago Board of Trade 
during four-hour trading periods on selected days out of the 
past two marketing years. 
7. Compare the outcome of selected situations where new-crop 
soybeans are hedged ahead of harvest through sale of one 5,000 
bushel Chicago Board of Trade futures contract versus five 
separate sales of 1,000 bushel MidAmerica contracts spread 
over the sutm:11er growing season. The hedging situations will be 
based on normal farm yields as well as market prices experienced 
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durin~ the past three yenrs. 
These are a few o( the q11esLions and nbjel'LivC':-1 Lhl:-1 pnpC'r wll I 
deal with. It is the intent of the author to familiarize the Iowa pro-
ducers with the methods of marketing and the composition of these 
different methods. An understanding of the available methods can lead 
t o better marketing and higher profits f rom grain production. 
Chapter II of this thesis will discuss the basis and other terms 
pertinent to this thesis. Chapter III will address the delivery costs 
and Chapters IV and V will discuss the storage hedge and new crop bids 
respectively . The discussion of the MidAmerica commodity exchange 
occurs in Chapter VI. 
Previous research 
Dr. Robert Wisner of Iowa State University has compiled a record 
of the corn and soybean basis for the Central Iowa area from 1966 through 
1978 . He pointed out that knowledge of the basis is essential for 
successful hedging in the grain futures market and that the transpor-
tation costs normally does set the lower limit of the bas is (18, p. 4). 
A similar study of cash futures price relationships was conducted 
by the University of Minnesota in 1977. The study determined the basis 
for corn and soybeans from 1972 through 1975 for Marshall and Stewart-
ville in southern Minnesota and for whea t in northwestern Minnesota (4). 
To this author's knowledge, no study has been conducted on the 
basis and delivery cost of corn and soybeans for specific locations in 
the North Central Pricing District of Iowa at this time. 
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The author is not aware of any published studies of the relation-
ship between futures prices on the MidAmerica Conunodity Exchange and 
the Chicago Board of Trade. 
Other publications on farm hedging, such as the ones from South 
Dakota State University (16) and the University of Kentucky (3) also 
stress the importance of the basis and the need for accurate local 
basis information as a guide for evaluating various grain marketing 
alternatives. 
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CHAPTER II. 
TERMS, DEFINITIONS AND TYPICAL 
NORTH CENTRAL IOWA CORN AND SOYBEAN BASIS 
Every field of study has its own terminology to expedite and clar-
ify the communication between individuals. This chapter will explain 
and provide definitions of terms used throughout the discussion . 
Cash selling 
Cash selling is simply taking the corn or soybeans to the elevator 
and receiving the quoted cash price for immediate delivery. 
Forward pricing 
Forward pricing or "forward contracting" is a written agreement 
between a producer and a buyer regarding the delivery and acceptance 
of a specified product at some future date (8, p . 9). The grain does 
not need to be in the hands of the producer to forward contract. If , 
in March, a farmer receives a bid of $7 for soybeans from the country 
elevator to be delivered in November , he can sell a portion of his 
expected new crop production at that price. The producer thus enters 
into an agreement with the elevator to deliver a certain quantity of 
soybeans in November . Forward pricing can also be an important tool 
in guiding the producer's planting decisions. For example, if corn can 
be forward priced at $2.25 and beans at $7, the producer may decide 
to plant considerably more soybeans than corn . According to Iowa 
State University, the typical 1978 production cost in Central Iowa with 
normal yields was $2.30 per bushel for corn and $5.54 per bushel for 
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soybeans (5, p. 2-3) . Using the above prices and costs, the producer 
could decide whether to make $1 .46 per bushel by planting soybeans or 
lose $.05 per bushel by planting corn. Obviously, the producer would 
plant more soybeans. 
A general rule-of-thumb is that one should not f o:rward price over 
one-half of what one expects to harvest until yield prospects are nearly 
assured. That is, if a farmer expects to harvest 6,000 bushels of 
soybeans, he should not forward price over 3,000 bushels. If the pro-
ducer were to forward price 3,000 bushels of soybeans and only raised 
1,000 bushels because of hail, flooding, lodging, etc., he is still 
responsible for delivering 3,000 bushels of soybeans to the elevator 
and receiving the $7.00 set price . The producer would have to buy an 
additional 2,000 bushels of soybeans on the open market to deliver to 
the elevator. If the price on the open market was $8. 00 per bushel, 
the farmer would take a considerable loss. The rule-of-thumb is not 
a hard , fast rule that applies in every situation. A producer that 
utilizes irrigation is not likely to be affected by drought and could 
therefore forward contract more than one-half the crop. The same 
applies to the producer with excellent sub-soil moisture in the spring 
or late in the swmner or early fall when production is nearly assured. 
The rule-of-thumb can be adjusted for the individual situation. 
Hedging 
Hedging is often a misused and misunderstood marketing tool. 
"Hedging in futures consists of making a contract to buy or sell on 
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standard terms, established and supervised by a commodity exchange, as 
a temporary substitute for an intended later contract to buy or sell on 
other terms" (20, p. 560) . The major grain exchanges for corn and soy-
beans are the Chicago Board of Trade and the Mid.America Commodity 
Exchange of Chicago. The Kansas City Board of Trade and the Minneapolis 
Grain Exchange are also major exchanges but specialize in wheat. 
Hedging reduces the risk of price fluctuations and essentially assures, 
within a relative narrow range, the price the farmer receives for his 
crop . If, in July, a farmer anticipates he will harvest 20,000 bushels 
of corn in the fall and the December futures price is $3.00, he may 
decide to sell 10,000 bushels of corn. The farmer sells two contracts 
(5,000 bushels per contract) on the Chicago Board of Trade. This con-
tract specifies that the farmer will deliver a specific quantity and 
quality of corn to Chicago or St. Louis and r eceive $3 .00 per bushel 
for the corn . In actuality the farmer will not likely deliver to 
Chicago or St. Louis but will buy back two contracts simultaneously with 
the cash sale of 10,000 bushels to a local elevator. The buying back 
of the two contracts liquidates his position in the futures market. 
Hedging has appr oximatel y assured the farmer of a price for his corn. 
The price he receives is $3.00 per bushel minus the basis (the differ-
ence between the futures price and the cash price at a local elevator). 
Use of basis information 
To clearly understand the hedging method of marketing, one must 
have a good grasp of the term basis. As noted earlier, the "basis is 
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the difference between the cash and futures prices" (10, p. 4). The 
basis generally varies across Iowa. That is, the basis is narrower in 
eastern Iowa than it is in western Iowa. The cash price is usually 
higher in eastern Iowa than western Iowa. The difference in the basis 
can be attributed to delivery costs and the local supply and demand 
conditions. 
The use of the basis can be easily demonstrated . If the local 
basis is $.60 under on November 1 and the predicted basis in March is 
$ .35 under the following transactions could occur . 
Example 2-1 
Cash Market 
Nov. 1 
Cash corn @ 
May corn futures @ 
$2 . 00 
$2.60 
March 15 
Sell cash corn @ $1.85 
Result: $ . 15 loss in cash 
price 
Cash grain income 
Gain on futures 
Gross income 
Harvest-time price 
Return for storage 
Futures Market 
Nov . 1 
Sells May corn futures @ $2.60 
March 15 
Buys back May corn @ $2 . 20 
Result: $.40 gain in futures 
contract 
$1.85 per bushel 
.40 II II 
$2 . 25 II II 
2 .00 II II 
$0.25 II II 
The above example demonstrates what a grain producer is confronted 
with on November 1. The cash corn at the local elevator is selling for 
$2.00 per bushel while the May corn futures are selling for $2 .60 per 
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bushel. The farmer decides to sell on the futures market at $2.60. On 
March 15, the cash corn at the local elevator is selling for $1.85 per 
bushel and the May corn futures are $2.20. He decides to sell his 
cash corn and buy back the May corn futures. The end results show the 
farmer receiving $2.25 per bushel for the corn as opposed to $2 . 00 per 
bushel at harvest time. The return for storing the corn from November 
to March 15, was $.25 per bushel. 
An easy way to calculate the potential hedging price, if one knows 
the normal basis at a particular time, is to subtract the normal basis 
from the futures price. That is, $2.60 for the May futures minus the 
$.35 basis in March yields $2.25 to the producer. If the basis had 
moved to $ .30 rather than $.35, the producer would have received $2.30 
per bushel ($2.60 - $.30 = $2.30). Conversely, had the basis been $.50 
in March, the producer would have received $2.10 per bushel ($2.60 -
$.50 = $2.10). 
Once the hedge is established, the only concern should be the 
basis change. If the May futures had reached $3.50 in March and the 
basis was $.35, the producer would still receive the $2.25 per bushel. 
This transaction can be shown as follows: 
Example 2-2 
Nov. 1 
Cash corn @ $2 .00 
May corn futures @ $2.60 
March 15 
Sells cash corn @ $3.15 
Result: $1.15 gain in cash 
price 
Cash grain 
12 
income 
Loss on futures 
Gross income 
Nov. 1 
Sells May corn futures @ $2.60 
March 15 
Buys back May corn @ $3 . 50 
Result: $.90 loss in futures 
contract 
$3 .15 per bushel 
(.90) " " 
$2.25 per bushel 
Harvest time price 2 .00 " " 
Return for storage $0.25 II II 
The gain in the cash market is off set by the loss in the futur es 
market. 
One can see that the basis movement is important. It can move with 
you or against you. That is why it is essential to have a good under-
standing and knowledge of the basis patterns. Basis information is 
also important in localizing futures prices and identifying profitable 
hedging opportunities before the hedge is placed . 
The f utures price is the price of corn in Chicago. To get the 
$2 . 60 per bushel in Chicago, the corn must be delivered to Chicago . 
The lower limit of the basis should then consist mainly of t he trans-
portation, insurance, the elevator's margin, unloading , handling, and 
inspection fees or costs of getting the corn to Chicago. The total of 
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these costs shall be referred to in the future as the delivery costs or 
delivery cost basis. The basis should not be wider than the deliv-
ery costs for any length of time. The basis for corn at any given 
location in Iowa can vary a great deal. The cash corn price can at 
times be higher than the futures price to as much as $ . 75 lower or 
more. The basis is affected by the local supply and demand conditions. 
If a drought reduces the crop in a high usage area, the price may be 
above the futures price. 
Even though it is difficult to predict precisely what the basis 
will be, one should be able to predict the lowest price paid by the 
elevator because of the delivery costs. If the futures are $3.00 per 
bushel and the cash price in Des Moines is $2 . 50, then the basis is 
$.SO. If it costs $ . 40 per bushel to get the corn from Des Moines to 
Chicago , then the producer would be financially ahead($ .10) to deliver 
the corn on a short contract. 
The average corn and soybean basis for the North Central Iowa 
pricing district are shown in figure 2-1. The data reflects the basis 
from July , 1974, to September 7, 1978. 
Average corn basis The widest average corn basis occurs during 
the harvest months of Sept ember, October, and November . This is the 
time when there is a lack of storage space, transportation from the 
country e levators to processors or to the gulf are overloaded, and 
the farmers are selling the crops to pay bills. The data show that 
once these problems have worked themselves out, the basis begins to 
narrow, normally during the middle of November. 
. 
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The narrowest basis occurs during the summer months of April 
through July . The storage and transportation problems have normally 
been solved at this time. 
Average soybean basis The widest average soybean basis occurs 
during September , Oc t ober, and November for the same reasons that the 
corn basis widened. The average basis also widened in March and April . 
Some of this can be explained by farmer selling to meet farm payments 
and a wider than normal basis during 1978. 1978 was an unusual year . 
The farm program was initiated after several years without a program, 
record harvests occurred in 1977 thus creating storage and transpor-
tation problems. 
The narrowest average soybean basis occurs during the spring and 
summer months of April through July. 
The basis was calculated by using the near term month, until the 
first of that month, and then reflects the next contract month . For 
example, the corn basis in January and February reflected the March 
futures while the March 1 basis reflected the May futures. 
New crop basis 
The new crop bids are the prices the elevators are willing to pay 
for harvest delivery of the crops that are currently growing in the field. 
The new crop basis is the difference between the November soybean 
futures or the December corn futures and the contracting prices the 
elevators are willing to pay for harvest delivery of grain . 
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CHAPTER III. 
DELIVERY COSTS 
The delivery costs of getting corn or soybeans from a specific 
location in Iowa to the elevators in Chicago, approved for delivery on 
CBT and MidAm contracts, should serve as a benchmark for establishing 
the lower end of the basis. That is, if the nearby corn futures are at 
$2 . 50 per bushel and the delivery costs are $ . 45 per bushel from Mason 
City, then the cash price at Mason Cit y should be $2 . 05 per bushel or 
more . If not, one might conclude the elevator is not taking advantage 
of the option of delivering on a futures contract or the country elevator 
is increasing its profit margin. 
The delivery costs consist of the actual transportation costs for 
getting the commodity to Chicago, the warehousing charges, inspection, 
weighing and grading , storage and insurance (3-day minimum), interest on 
the grain or soybeans for two weeks, and the country elevator's merchan-
dising margin. 
Transportation Charges 
The transportation charges are the largest component of the delivery 
costs and can vary with the mode of transportation. For instance, rail 
companies offer both single car rates and various multi-car rates . 
Obviously , the larger the shipment the cheaper are the per bushel charges. 
The Chicago and Northwestern domestic single car rate from Fort Dodge to 
Chicago for corn is $ . 2912 per bushel (1) . The Chicago and Northwestern 
17 
domestic SO car unit rate from December 1 through September 30 is 
$.2408 per bushel (2). The SO car rate from October 1 through November 30 
is $.2632. The higher rate at harvest time reflects the supply and 
demand conditions of the rail cars. One can readily see that if an ele-
vator uses the SO car rate from December 1 through September, transpor-
tation costs are $.0504 less per bushel than the single car rate. 
These rail transportation charges have increased over time with the 
rising fuel, labor and equipment costs. Table 3-1 shows the increase in 
transportation costs of shipping corn from Mason City to Chicago from 
August 19, 1973 to August 21, 1978. On August 19, 1973, corn could be 
sent by rail to Chicago for $.1812 per bushel. The present rate is 
$.308 per bushel . 
These increases in the transportation charges will widen the basis 
since these charges are a major component of the basis. As the trans-
portation charges increase over the years, so also will the basis widen. 
There are two types of rail rates for sending corn and soybeans from 
a particular location in Iowa to Chicago. One is an export rate and the 
other is a domestic rate. The export rate is for grain to move directly 
to Chicago for export only. The domestic rate allows the crop to move 
to Chicago and on to other locations for use, processing, etc. See 
Table 3-2 below. 
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Table 3-1. General interstate single car freight rate increases from 
a Mason City to Chicago 
Corn 
Freight Rate Percent 
Date ExParte ¢/bu . Increase 
8-19- 73 X-295-A 18.12 3% 
3-16-74 X-299-A 18.63 2 . 8% 
3- 19-74 X-303-A 19.37 4% 
6- 20- 74 X-305-A (X301+305) 22 . 01 3.3% plus 10% 
4-27-75 X- 310-A 23.55 7% 
6- 20-75 X- 313 24. 72 5% 
10-11-75 X- 313 25 . 35 2.5% 
10-7-76 X-330 27.12 7% 
1- 7-77 X- 336 28.20 4% 
2-22-78 X-343 29.61 5% 
8-21-78 X-349 30.80 4% 
ainformation received from Dr. Thomas P. Drinka, Transportation 
specialist, Department of Economics at Iowa State University , Ames, on 
September 15, 1978 . 
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Table 3- 2. August 1978 Chicago and Northwestern Railway single car rates 
to Chicago (1). 
Ex2ort (¢/bu.) Domestic (¢/bu.) 
Corn Sox beans Corn Sox beans 
Algona 30.80 33.00 32.48 47.70 
Fort Dodge 17.64 18.90 29.12 47.70 
Mason City 19.04 20.40 30.80 47.70 
One can see that the least expensive rate is the export rate . For 
example, from Mason City one can ship corn to Chicago for 11.76¢ per 
bushel less than the domestic rate by using the export rate (30.8¢ -
19.04¢ 11.76¢ per bushel). 
For an elevator in Iowa to delivery to Chicago on a futures contract, 
the elevator must use the domestic rate. They must supply rail or water 
billing to engage the domestic proportional rate from Chicago to New 
York. This is a requirement of the railroad tariffs and the CBT. 
The railroads have developed two types of domestic rates from Chi-
cago to other destinations. One is the flat rate and the other is a 
proportional rate. 
The flat rate is a specific rate to send the crop from Chicago to a 
specific location. The proportional rate is a lower rate and is normally 
used only if the crop was sent to Chicago by rail. Included in the pro-
portional rate is the capability of the crop to be processed along the 
way and the end products then shipped on to other destinations. 
Trucks may also be used to deliver grain to Chicago. If trucks are 
used, the individual delivering on a futures contract must pay a penalty 
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(transit billing) of approximately 16c per bushel to the party taking 
delivery of the grain, which is the difference between the flat rate and 
1 the proportional rate . This permits the buyer of the futures contract 
(the one receiving delivery) to always know what the transportation costs 
will be from Chicago to other locations. 
A producer (or elevator) in Iowa who is short (has sold) a contract 
of corn or soybeans has two options for fulfilling the contract obligation. 
He must either buy back the contract on the futures market or deliver the 
coDllllodity to an approved delivery warehouse. The closest authorized 
warehouses to Iowa are in Chicago and the St. Louis area . The Assistant 
Secretary of the CBT lists five grain companies with six licensed ele-
vators in Chicago with combined storage capacity of 49,085 , 000 bushels . 
The St. Louis area has four licensed elevators with storage capacity of 
6,648,000 bushles. One grain company owns three of the elevators in 
St . Louis. If one delivers to St. Louis there is a $.04 per bushel 
discount . That is if a corn futures contract was sold at $2 . 54 and 
delivered upon in St. Louis, the producer would receive $2 . 50 per bushel 
as opposed to $2.54 per bushel in Chicago . 
The discussion will now focus on the August 1978 delivery costs 
from Algona , Mason Cit y, and Fort Dodge in North Central Iowa to Chicago 
and St. Louis. These towns were selected because each is served by two 
major railroads, they are geographically spread throughout the North 
1
conversation with Frank Polem, a CBT Transportation specialist , 
on August 24, 1978. 
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Central District, and each has adequate facilities to handle a large 
volume of corn and soybeans. 
Table 3-3. August 1978 single car corn domestic rail rates to Chicago (1). 
Algona 
Fort Dodge 
Mason City 
Table 3-4. 
Algona 
Fort Dodge 
Mason City 
Corn (¢/bu.) 
32.48 
29.12 
30.80 
a August 1978 truck rate to Chicago 
Corn/Soybeans 
(¢/bushel) 
30 
30 
30 
Soybeans (¢/bu.) 
47.70 
47.70 
47 . 70 
aConversation with Jim Zigrang, billing officer for Umthun Trucking 
Company, Eagle Grove, Iowa on August 30, 1978. 
Table 3-5. 
Algona 
Fort Dodge 
Mason City 
a August 1978 truck rates to St. Louis 
Corn (¢/bu.) 
59.36 
54.32 
55.17 
Soybeans (¢/bu.) 
63.6 
58.2 
59.1 
aConversation with Jim Zigrand, billing officer for Umthun Trucking 
Company, Eagle Grove, Iowa, on August 30, 1978. 
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The approximate highway mileage from Algona to Chicago is 453 miles 
and 459 miles to St. Louis. Mason City is 447 miles from Chicago and 
453 miles from St. Louis while Fort Dodge is 414 miles from Chicago and 
420 from St. Louis. 
The truck rates to Chicago are less than to St. Louis primarily 
because the truckers are fairly certain they can haul back a full load 
from Chicago. This is not the case with St. Louis. The rates quoted to 
St. Louis reflect the trucks returning empty. If trucks could bring back 
a full load to central Iowa, Umthun officials indicate the cost could 
be reduced to approximately 30¢ per bushel. 
The rail rates to St . Louis also are more expensive than to Chicago 
according to the tariffs of the Illinois Central Gulf, Rock Island, and 
the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad companies. Accord-
ing to Item 3480 of Rock Tariff 34560, the rail rate to St. Louis is 
$ . 0392 more expensive than to Chicago. The higher transportation charges 
plus the $.04 discount on delivery excludes the alternative of delivering 
to St. Louis. 
We will now examine the full costs of delivering on a futures 
contract to Chicago. The source of the charges other than the transpor-
tation charges of Tables 3-6 and 3-7 was by personal communication with 
CFTC and grain company officials in Chicago. The merchandising margin 
is an hypothetical example. Merchandising margins are not published and 
will vary slightly with the season and local supply and demand conditions. 
The Chicago elevator charges range from five to six cents per bushel 
for corn or soybeans according to officials from Cargill, Inc . and Con-
tinental Grain Co. , and an unpublished survey conducted by the CFTC during 
the first quarter of 1978. These char ges include such things as inspection, 
weighing, and elevation of the crop to the storage area. 
Table 3-6, August 1978 total truck delivery costs to Chicago (¢/bushel) 
Corn 
Trans- Merchan-
port a- Transit Elevator Storage Interest dising Total 
tion Billing Charges & Ins . on Crop Margin Costs 
Algona 30 16 6 . 5 .8 5 58.3 
Fort Dodge 30 16 6 .5 . 8 5 58.3 
Mason City 30 16 6 .5 .8 5 58.3 
Soybeans 
Algona 30 16 6 .5 2.3 8 62 . 8 
Fort Dodge 30 16 6 .5 2 . 3 8 62.8 
Mason City 30 16 6 .5 2 . 3 8 62.8 
Table 3-7. August 1978 total single car rail delivery costs to Chicago 
(¢/bushel). 
Corn 
Merchan-
Single Elevator Storage & Interest dising Total 
Car Charges Insurance on CroE Margin Costs 
Algona 32 .48 6 .5 . 8 5 44 . 70 
Fort Dodge 29.12 6 .5 .8 5 41.42 
Mason City 30.80 6 .5 .8 5 43.10 
Soybeans 
Algona 47.7 6 . 5 2 . 3 8 64.5 
Fort Dodge 47.7 6 .s 2.3 8 64 . 5 
Mason City 47.7 6 . 5 2. 3 8 64.5 
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One can see from Tables 5.6 and 5.7 that the least expensive mode 
of transportation for corn to Chicago is by rail. Soybean delivery costs 
are approximately the same for rail or by truck. 
Knowing the total delivery costs one can now determine what the lower 
limits of the basis should be for corn and soybeans . They are as follows: 
Algona 
Fort Dodge 
Mason City 
Corn 
44.70 
41.42 
43.00 
Soybeans 
62.8 
62.8 
62.8 
Theoretically, the elevator in Algona should have a basis of no more 
than $.447 per bushel for corn and $.628 per bushel for soybeans . 
Suppose, for any length of time, the basis is wider than the above figures 
and delivery on a futures contract is physically possible. One would have 
to conclude the elevator is either receiving a larger merchandising margin, 
is not taking advantage of the better marketing alternatives or it is not 
practical or possible to deliver on futures contracts. 
If delivery on a future contract is possible and the basis is lower 
than the delivery costs, the elevator has an incentive to buy grain 
locally, sell the futures and deliver the grain on a futures contract. 
This would continue until the cash bids were increased and/or the futures 
prices declined until the incentive for delivery no longer exists. 
Now that it has been deter.mined wha t the delivery costs are or 
what the lower limit of the basis should be, how do these figures 
compare to the actual basis? In 1977 the average corn basis for the 
lower range of cash bids in North Central Iowa, using the last four 
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Thursday's of each t~rminating futures contract, was $ .318. Not once 
did this corn basis widen to more than $.42 under the expiring futures 
contract . The average soybean basis under the expiring futures during 
the same time period was $.427 . Only twice out of 26 weeks was this 
soybean basis wider than $ .62 . As with corn, these soybean basis 
comparisons were based on the lower range of cash bids for North Central 
Iowa. 
These data tell one that the average cash basis in 1977 was almost 
always less than the delivery costs . This indicates the producer in 
1977 was financially ahead to sell on the cash market and liquidate 
the futures position rather than to deliver on the futures contract. 
Delivery costs in nearly all cases were more than the normal basis in 
1977. 
Throughout discussion with Chicago grain trade officials, it became 
apparent that delivering on a futures contract is very seldom done, except 
by the large grain companies which own approved delivery wa rehouses. 
If an individual wants to deliver on a futures contract, he must 
contact one of the authorized elevators and make arrangements to deliver 
the commodity. The authorized warehouses are not required to accept 
grain from others for storage or delivery. It is up to the authorized 
elevators to decide whether or not to accept the grain. On August 30, 
1978, one manager of an approved delivery elevator in Chicago reported 
his firm's elevator was nearly full of company owned grain . The firm 
also was not accepting delivery of grain on futures contracts from others 
at that time. 
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lf delivery is impeded or is physically impossible, there is a 
possibility that the Iowa grain basis could sometimes be wider than the 
delivery cost basis. If so, such conditions would tend to work to the 
disadvantage of Iowa grain farmers or elevators who were selling their 
crop through sales of futures contracts. Such conditions also would have 
important implications for the cash grain pricing structure in Iowa . 
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CHAPTER IV. 
STORAGE HEDGING PROCEDURES AND RESULTS 
Storage Hedge 
A storage hedge can be defined as selling futures contracts (nor-
mally July futures or the month the grain is expected to move from 
storage), storing the crop until spring or summer when historically the 
basis narrows, and then selling the cash crop and buying back the futures 
contract simultaneously. ~age hedges should be established in the 
fall (October or November) and liquidated after the basis has narrowed. 
The optimum time for liquidation of a storage hedge will var y slightly 
from year to year depending on various conditions affecting the basis. 
The purpose of the storage hedge is to take advantage of a narrowing 
basis, thus earning income from the crop and increased net returns. 
Storage hedges also protect an individual against a possible price decline 
while the crop is in storage (1, p. 177). If prices decline during the 
hedging period, a loss in cash prices is expected to be offset by a gain 
in the fu tures position. To provide price protection, the size of the 
futures position should just equal the volume of the cash cormnodity 
which the farmer or elevator operator wishes to hedge. 
Before potential returns from a storage hedge can be calculated, 
historical basis data must be collected and analyzed for the geographical 
area being considered. This chapter will deal with storage hedging pro-
cedures, methods of data collection and an evaluation of North Central Iowa 
hedging returns. 
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Procedure for evaluating ~torage hedg1=_ng returns 
One formula that can be used for estimating the potential return on 
a storage hedge is as follows: 
R = B - B - HCl 
B E 
where: 
R = return for storage hedge 
BB = beginning basis when the storage hedge is initiated 
BE = expected ending basis when the storage hedge will be terminated 
HC expected hedging costs, including crop shrinkage costs, brokerage 
fees, and interest on margin deposits with the conunodity broker. 
For example, if the beginning basis is $.50 under July and the ending 
basis is $ .30 under July and the hedging costs are $ . 02 per bushel , the 
return for storage is $. 18 ($ . 50 - $ . 30 - $.02 = $.18). This $.18 is the 
gross return for storing the grain. If costs of storage are less than 
$.18, the storage hedge would be profitable. If storage costs are more 
than $ .18, the storage hedge would be unprofitable. 
With the above formula and calculations, one can again see the 
importance of the basis and its historical patterns. In essence, the 
gross return for storage is the change in basis from the time the storage 
hedge was originated until its termination. 
1Presented by Dr. Ronald Raikes in Economics Course 531, fall quar-
ter, 1977, at Iowa State University. 
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The specific procedures to establish and lift a storage hedge are as 
follows: 
A. To place a storage hedge: 
(1) Have a long cash grain position, with the crop either 
stored or growing in the field. 
(2) Determine the expected return to storage using the pre-
ceding formula . 
(3) If a profit potential exists, sell future contracts on one 
of the exchanges, with sales volume equal to the desired 
hedging volume . 
B. To lift. the hedge: 
(1) Sell the cash grain. 
(2) Buy back the future contracts on the same day the cash grain 
is sold, preferably about the same time during the day. 
(3) Calculate the actual return for the hedge , using the 
following formula where actual basis and hedging costs are 
substituted for expected values . 
R = B - B - HC B E 
s~~rce and procedure~ for developing basis data 
The Marketing Division of the Iowa Department of Agriculture has 
been given the responsibility of collecting and reporting daily prices 
for corn and soybeans in the six Iowa price reporting districts. These 
districts are shown in Figure 4-1. This discussion will focus on prices 
reported for the North Central Iowa District. 
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Each business day , the Marketing Division of the Iowa Department of 
Agriculture polls eight to ten elevators in each price reporting district 
and reports the highes t and lowest prices paid to producers. The report 
is made available to Iowa newspapers, radio stations and wire services, 
and is in the following form: 
Table 4-1 . Iowa's old and new crop cash grain prices paid to farmers 
August 19, 1976 Old-Crop Bids New-Crop Bids 
District Corn _Soybeans Corn Soybeans 
Northwest 261- 270 615-620 225-240 605-615 
Nor th Central 260-265 612-625 233-243 604-624 
Nor theast 261-267 614-626 232-238 604-621 
Southwest 257-267 605-620 224-240 596-625 
South Cent r al 260- 270 612-617 231-235 606-614 
Southeast 263-273 615-630 234-250 605-623 
Cash prices from the North Central Iowa Distric t were compared with 
the July futures prices to develop a North Central I owa basis history . 
This basis history was then used in evaluating storage hedging returns. 
The resulting basis data for corn and soybeans are shown in Appendix 
Table A-1. The Thursday prices were used for the weekly price comparisons . 
In cases where markets were closed on Thursdays for holidays, the next 
earliest business day ' s prices were used. 
Storage Hedging Results 
Several examples of storage hedges based on actual prices within the 
past four years follow : 
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Historically, the basis at harvest time is the widest and narrows 
into the early summer. Thus, storage hedges typically would be established 
during the harvest season and lifted during the early summer. Referring 
to Figures 4-2 through 4-9, one can see that in the last four years the 
widest basis for corn and soybeans occurred during October or November , 
except for 1977-1978 when the widest soybean basis occurred in late March 
(Figure 4-6) . The wide soybean basis during March 1978 can be attributed 
to the transportation problems. Rail cars were in short supply along with 
problems of ice remaining on the Mississippi River. 
Because the return for storage is the basis change during storage , 
one can calculate the approximate return by referring to Figures 4-2 
through 4-9. For consistency, this discussion will use the low bids 
shown in the graphs in evaluating hedging returns. 
If on October 23, 1975, the producer had hedged his corn crop, the 
basis from the July contract would have been $.71 under July. (See 
Figure 4-3) . If he had lifted the hedge on May 6, 1976, the return to 
the storage hedge would have been: 
R BB - BE - HC 
R = $ . 71 - $.26 - $ . 26 
R = $.19 
At this point , it is necessary to define hedging costs more precisely. 
First, these costs include the brokerage fee to execute the hedges. 
Secondly, margin money is required by the CFTC to be given in advance 
to the brokerage house to insure against contract default. The interest 
on the margin money, for the length of time the hedge is in effect, is 
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Figure 4-2 . 1974- 75 North Cen t r al Towa corn basis (Unde r 
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Figu r e 6- 6. 1974-75 North Cent r al Iowa soybPan basis 
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Figure 9-7 . 1975-76 North Cent r a l Iowa soybean basis (Und e r 
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Figure 4-8 . 1976-77 North Centra l Iowa soybean basis (Under 
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part of the hedging costs. Thirdly, there is an inte rest cost on the 
grain inventory if the producer stores the grain from December to May 
ar.d fourthl y, there are extra drying and extra shrinkage costs to bring 
corn moisture 1.5 to 2.0 percentage points below the No . 2 moisture 
standard to insure safe storage. 
The interest costs of carrying the grain from October to May can 
be calculated as follows: 
1
8
2
·5% h x (number of months of hedge) x 
mont s 
(crop price at harvest) = Interest costs 
The above corn example calculated as follows: 
si;% x (7) x ($2 . 35) = 11.65 cents per bushel 
The inter est costs of carrying soybeans will be greater than corn 
because of the higher market value of beans . 
The shrink.age costs for corn can be calculated as follows: 
(2. 5 pts . moisture) x (1. 25 shrink factor) x 
(crop price at harvest) = extra shrinkage cost 
The above corn example can be calculated as follows: 
(2.5) x (1.25) x ($2.35) = 7.34 cents per bushel 
There is also a 1.5 cent per bushel drying cost for moisture removal 
from 15.5% to 13 . 0% for safe storage of corn, a one cent per bushel cost 
for moving grain in and out of on-farm storage bins, and a one percent 
quality deterioration and storage shrink for storing corn into warm 
weather (2 . 35 cents per bushel). 
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Therefore, the total hedging costs for corn in October 1975, would 
have been 26.34 cents per bushel (2 + 11.65 + 7.34 + 1.5 + 1.5 + 2.35 = 
26.34) or rounded to $ . 26 per bushel. 
This example assumed that the corn was stored from October to May 
in existing on-farm storage. In that case, the ownership costs for on-
farm storage would be fixed costs and could be disregarded in any given 
year's storage decisions. I f the producer had to store the crop at an 
e levator, there would have been approximately an additional $.13 per 
bushel cost to cover t ypical elevator storage charges for seven 
months' storage. However, handling costs for moving grain in and out 
of f arm storage would have been avoided, and extra drying and shrinkage 
costs would have been slightly lower. Net costs for elevator storage in 
a typical Iowa situation would have been about six cents higher than 
in this on-farm situa tion. These results thus show a potential hedging 
and storage profit f rom October to May of $ .19 a bushel . 
If the corn had been hedged on the same day as the above example 
I 
but lifted on December 4, 1975, the r e turn would have been as follows: 
(See Figure 4-3) 
Beginning basi s 
Ending basis 
Hedging costs 
Brokerage fee 
Shrinkage 
$ .71 
-.41 
-.142 
Interest costs 
Moisture removal (15.5% to 13%) 
Extra handling cost 
Net Return $. 158 per bushel 
. 02 
. 073 
. 024 
.015 
.01 
$ . 142 per bushel 
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One can see that the hedging costs were reduced from $.26 to $.14 
when the storage hedge was lifted within two months of placement rather 
than the seven months. However, the lower hedging costs were offset by 
the wider basis when the hedge was lifted in December. The net result 
was an additional $.03 per bushel profit for the seven month storage 
hedge as compared with the two-month hedge . 
This example also assumed the producer used on-farm storage. Had 
the producer stored the grain at an elevator, the two-month storage 
hedge would have returned a greater profit than the seven-month hedge. 
The return for hedging soybeans in 1975 was even greater. If on 
October 23, 1975, a producer had hedged soybeans on the July contract, 
the basis would have been $.95 under July. If the hedge had been lifted 
on June 10, 1976, the ending basis would have been $.38 under July. The 
gross return for storage would have been $ . 30 per bushel. 
R = B - B - HG B E 
R $.95 - $.38 - $.27 
R $.30 per bushel 
Guidelines for storage hedging 
These situations were selected as examples of favorable storage 
hedging returns; not all storage hedges will be this profitable. What 
then are some guidelines for a profitable storage hedge. 
Using the past four years as a benchmark, one may expect that in 
October or November in North Central Iowa, the corn basis is likely to 
widen to $.60 or more under the July futures (See Figures 4-2 through 
4-5). Storage hedging returns typically would be greatest from selling 
a July corn futures contract at that time. Referring to the same graphs, 
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one can see that during May and June, the July basis narrowed to at least 
$.28 under in three out of the four years and narrowed to $.09 under in 
May of 1975. This would typically be a good time to consider liquidating 
hedges. 
It must be kept in mind that local supply and demand condit ions 
and transporta tion conditions greatly affect the local basis in any 
given year. For example, if in October the basis is $ . 60 under July and 
the supply of corn greatly exceeds available storage space, chances are 
the basis will widen even further . If elevators are accepting corn and 
storing it on the ground, that would be a clear indication that storage 
and transportation are i n short supply . If this is the case, the harvest 
time basis will more than likely widen and would increase potential 
returns for storage hedges. With normal supplies of corn in November , 
the July corn basis reflects the December futures price plus the cost 
of storing corn from December to May (21, p. 1256). 
If in the early summer the basis narrows to $.32 under July and 
demand exceeds available supplies, the basis may narrow even further . 
If so, hedging returns could be increased by waiting for the basis to 
narrow further before liquidating a storage hedge. Just as important 
as recognizing the target basis of $.60 under July at harvest and $.28 
under July in late spring for corn, one must clearly understand these 
determinants of the basis to maximize hedging profits. 
Figur es 4-6 through 4-9 show comparable North Central Iowa basis 
patterns for soybeans from 1974 through 1978. As with corn, the July 
basis typically is widest in October and November and narrows into May 
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and June . 
The widest soybean basis occurred in November 1974, when it reached 
$1.31 under the July futures (See Figure 4-6). The narrowest basis of 
the crop year occurred in the last week of April 1975, when the cash 
price was $ .13 under the July futures. If a storage hedge had been 
established and terminated during these times, the return to storage 
would have been $.95 per bushel ($1.31 - .13 - .23 = $.95) . 
Because of the variability of the bean basis, it is difficult to 
offer specific guidel ines on the basis level at which to establish a 
storage hedge. During the four years studied, the widest basis in October 
or November ranged from $.73 to $1.31 under July. One hedging guideline 
might be as follows: When the harvest time basis reaches $ .70, under 
July , one should be aware of the factors affecting the basis and be 
prepared to establish a storage hedge if the U.S. crop is larger than 
expected market requirements for the coming year. 
The narrowes t basis in May and June varied from $.23 to $ .46 under 
July for the four years studied here. Once again, one must have a 
knowledge of factors affecting the basis in order to make an accurate 
decision on when to lift the storage hedge. 
Return for hedged and unhedged storage 
Table 4-2 shows the maximum gross return for the storage hedge 
as compared to t he increase in cash price during the same period. 
Table 4-2 indicates that from 1974 through 1978, a routine storage 
hedging program for corn offered a greater gross return than storlng 
unhedged corn; a routine storage hedging program for soybeans offered 
lower gross returns than storing unhedged soybeans. The variability 
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Table 4-2. Yearly maximum gross returns in North Central Iowa for 
storage hedges and for storing unhedged corn and soybeans, 
in dollars per bushel, 1974-75 through 1977-78. 
Maximum Gross Returns Seasonal Price 
for Storage Hedges Rise for Unhedged 
Grain During Same Period 
Corn Soybeans Com Soybeans 
1974-75 $.56 $1.18 $- .33 $-1.10 
1975-76 . 45 .57 .25 1. 70 
1976-77 . 34 .so .04 1. 93 
1977-78 .34 .34 .42 1.30 
Average $.423 $.648 $ . 095 $ .958 
of both hedging returns and unhedged returns was much greater for soybeans 
than for corn during the 1974-75 through 1977-78 period. 
Risk reduction through hedging 
The unhedged grain prices varied much more than the hedged grain. 
Unhedged corn and soybeans varied $.75 and $3.03 per bushel respectively . 
Hedged corn ranged only $.22 per bushel and hedged soybeans $.84 per 
bushel. The routine hedge would then tend to stabilize the storage return; 
however, there would be some sacrifice in price for soybeans. 
The maximum gross returns for storage hedges in Table 4-2 exclude 
interest costs, shrinkage, and other storage expenses . Had these costs 
been included, the net returns would have been substantially less than 
shown in Table 4-2. However, these data indicate storage hedges at times 
can be a profitable marketing tool for the producer as well as for the 
country e levator operator. 
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CHAPTER V. 
BASIS PATTERNS FOR FORWARD CONTRACTING 
BIDS DURING SUMMER AND EARLY FALL 
New Crop Basis 
The new crop basis is defined here as the difference in price 
between the December futures for corn, or November futures for soybeans, 
and the cash price the elevator will pay at harvest time. In Iowa, 
published new crop bids generally become available around July 1 and 
continue into September. The new crop bids reflect the price elevators 
are willing to pay or contract for harvest delivery of crops that are 
currently growing in the field. 
Information on new crop basis patterns can be helpful to producers 
in deciding whether to forward contract with the elevator or to hedge 
on one of the commodity exchanges. Typically one might expect country 
elevators to take some price protection in offering forward contracts 
for harvest delivery, with the result that the new crop bid to the 
producer might not be as great as the return from hedging on either the 
Chicago Board of Trade or MidAm. Thus, one of the main focal points 
for this analysis was the difference between the new crop basis during 
the summer and early fall, and the actual basis that resulted during 
the harvest season. The data on the new crop corn and soybean bids 
for the years 1976 and 1977 were obtained from the Marketing Division 
of the Iowa Department of Agriculture. The data are presented as in 
Table 4-1. 
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The Marketing Division began compiling new crop corn and soybean 
bids by Iowa price repor ting districts in 1976. Therefor e , at the time 
of this analysis, only two years of data were available . Additional 
years of data would be helpful in developing conclusive patterns of new 
crop movements. 
1976 and 1977 Basic Patterns 
If one computes the mean of the high and low new crop basis for the 
North Central Iowa pricing district and compares it to the mean of the 
high and low normal basis at harvest time (October through November), 
one finds the following r esults shown in Example 5-1 for 1975, 1976 
and 1977. 
Example 5 -1 
New Crop Bids 
Mean Basis Range Mean Cash Basis 
July- SeEt· Oct. 20-Nov . se2t . 30- Nov. 
Corn Soybeans Corn Soybeans 
1975 31. 8-43 . 5 27.4-43 . 6 
1976 35.5- 45.2 43.3-55.1 29.1-38.9 34.9-48.1 
1977 41. 3- 48 . 6 38.7- 63.7 29.3-37.5 33.3- 47 . 2 
Avg. Range 38.4-46 . 9 41. 0-59. 4 30 .1-40.0 31. 9-46. 3 
Aver age 42 . 7 50 . 2 35.0 39 . 1 
One can see that on the average the cash corn basis is 7.7 cents 
(42 .7-35 . 0) lower and soybeans are 11.1 cents lower (50 . 2-39 . 1) than the 
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new crop basis. Does this mean a producer might consistently expect to 
r eceive 7.2 cents per bushel more for corn or 11.l cents per bushel 
more for beans each year by hedging rather than by f orward contracting? 
Not necessarily so l 
First, it will cost approximately two to three cents per bushel 
to hedge when brokerage fees and interest on the margin are taken into 
consideration. Secondly, there is no assurance of what the basis will 
be at harvest time in any given year. The harvest time basis may some-
times be wider than the new crop bids. In October 1975, the corn basis 
was down to 43.5 cents under December. If forward contracts were based 
on the 35 . 0 cent average harvest time corn basis for the past three 
years, the producer would have been financially ahead to forward con-
tract that year. 
Thirdly, since public reporting of new crop bids was initiated in 
1976, conclusions must be drawn cautiously with only two years of data. 
More years of new crop data are needed to conclude whether the forward 
contracting is consistently wider than the harvest time basis. With 
only two years data, however, the results show some incentive for 
hedging. On the average, hedging would have paid an additional four to 
five cents for corn and nine cents for soybeans, after deducting hedging 
costs . 
Examples of hedging results 
A producer in North Central Iowa on August 5, 1976, could receive 
new crop bids between $2.25 to $2.35 for corn from his local elevator. 
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For discussion purposes, let's suppose the producer received the mid-
point between the high and low prices or $2.30 per bushel. The December 
corn futures on August 5, 1976, closed at $2.72. The new crop basis 
was $ .42 under December ($2.72-$2.30 = $.42) . How did this compare to 
hedging on a December contract on that same day and lifting the hedge 
and sell ing the cash corn on November 18, 1976 during the peak harvest 
period? 
On November 18, 1976, the December corn futures closed at $2 . 38 per 
bushel. The mean cash price at the elevator was $2.09 with a basis of 
$ . 29 under December ($2.38-$2.09) = $. 29. Let's examine the results 
from such a hedge as shown in Example 5-2. First, the producer would 
have received the $2 . 09 for the cash corn plus $.34 ($2.72-$2.38 = $ . 34) 
gain on the futures contract transaction minus the $.02 hedging costs . 
This adds up to $2.41 per bushel ($2 . 09 + $ . 34 - $.02) = $2 . 41. 
Example 5- 2. 
Cash Market 
August 5, 1976 
New crop corn bid at $2.30 
November 18, 1976 
Sold corn at $2 .09 
Result: $ . 21 decline in 
cash price 
Futures Market 
August 5, 1976 
Sold December corn 
futures at 
Bought back December 
futures at 
$2.72 
$2.38 
Result: $ . 34 gain in futures 
contract 
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Cash price r eceived $2.09 per bushel 
Gain on futures trade .34 II II 
Less hedging costs -( . 02) II II 
Net price $2.41 per bushel 
August 5 new crop bid 2.30 " " 
Return for hedge $ .11 per bushel 
The results from this example show a potential $.11 extra profit 
per bushel by hedging as opposed to selling on a new crop bid . If a 
producer raises200 acres of corn averaging 100 bushels per acre and 
markets one-half of his crop or 10,000 bushels by hedging then he would 
have received an additional $1100 as compared with forward contracting 
in early August 1976. 
There was a clear advantage to hedging in the above example. The 
r esults are not always that beneficial, however . For example , if the 
same producer had sold his new crop corn on July 29, 1976 he could have 
received $2.30 per bus hel in a forward contract for harvest delivery. 
The December futures closed at $2. 68, with a $ . 38 basis on new crop 
contracting bids . 
If he had hedged on the Chicago Board of Trade at $2.68 on July 29, 
1976, sold his cash corn for $2 . 10, and lifted his hedge at $2.52 on 
October 28, 1976, his net return per bushel would have been only $2.24; 
($2.10 for the cash corn plus $.16 futures trading return minus the $.02 
hedging costs). 
Example 5-3. 
Cash Market 
July 29, 1976 
New crop corn bid at $2.30 
October 28, 1976 
Sold corn at $2.10 
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Futures Market 
July 29, 1976 
Sold December corn 
futures at 
October 28, 1976 
Bought back December 
futures at 
$2.68 
$2.52 
Result: $ . 20 decline in 
cash price 
Result: $.16 gain in futures 
contract 
Cash price received $ 2.10 per bushel 
Gain on fu tures trade .16 It " 
Less hedging costs -(. 02) It " 
Net price $ 2.24 per bushel 
July 29 new crop bid 2.30 " " 
Return for hedge $(-.06)per bushel 
This example shows a $ .06 per bushel or $600 lower return for 
the 10,000 bushels hedged than would have been received with a 
forward contract sale. 
As stated in Chapter IV. there is a systematic way to calculate 
the return on a hedge. The formula is as follows: 
Beginning basis minus ending basis minus hedging costs = 
net r eturn (R = BB - BE - HC) 1 
Using this formula, the first example can be calculated as follows: 
Beginning basis ($2 . 72 - $2.30 = $ .42) 
Ending basis ($2.38 - $2.09 = $.24) 
Hedging costs 
Net return 
$ .42 
-. 29 
-.02 
$.11 per bushel 
1 
Presented by Dr. Ronald Raik~s in Economics Course 531, fall 
quarter, 1977, at Iowa State University. 
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The second example can be calculated as follows: 
Beginning basis ($2.68-$2.30 = $ .38) 
Ending basis ($2.52-$2.10 = $.42) 
Hedging costs 
Evaluating new-crop basis movement 
$ • 38 
-.42 
-.02 
$-.06 per bushel 
The above examples show that there is not a clear cut advantage of 
hedging all the time. Many factors such as transportation enter into 
the picture at harvest time. If a shortage of rail cars exists, the 
local basis will widen, and reduce the net return to the producer. If 
the supply of corn is great at harvest time, the basis also may widen 
because of the lack of storage. If however, the demand for corn is 
greater than the supply, then the basis will narrow , and return more to 
the producer than normally would have been expected from a new crop hedge . 
Conclusions on New Crop Hedging 
The timing also is important in maximizing profits. One must know 
when to get in and out of a hedge. A very simple rule would be to 
use hedging as a forward pricing tool when the new crop contracting 
basis is wider than normal and lift che hedge when the basis is narrower 
than normal. This can only be determined by observing historical basis 
patterns for the producer' s area . 
The data in Table 5-1 for North Central Iowa indicate that hedging 
has been more profitable than forward contracting . One could hedge 
corn when the new crop basis widened to $.46 or more and lifted hedges 
when the basis narrowed to $ . 38 or less. Soybeans could be hedged around 
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the $.59 basis and lifted when the basis narrowed to approximately 
$.41 or less. 
Figures 5-1 through 5-4 demonstrate the new crop corn and soybean 
basis and the cash basis for 1976 and 1977. For example, in Figure 5-1, 
the cash corn 1977 basis narrowed substantially after the new crop bids 
had terminated. A hedge could have been placed from June to October and 
lifted in November for a very favorable basis movement . What about corn 
in 1976? Does the same pattern repeat itself? Definitely not. The 
narrowest basis occurred September 25, under the new crop bids. 
Soybeans (Figures 5-3 and 5-4) also demonstrate the random basis 
patterns for the new crop basis as compared to the cash basis. That is, 
during the new crop bids, one is no more likely to get a wider than 
normal basis in July than in August. There is no historical time period 
which is definitely better than the other. 
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CHAPTER VI. 
COMPARI SON OF THE MIDAMERICA COMMODITY 
EXCHANGE AND THE CIIICACO BOARD OF TRADE 
The MidAmerica Conunodity Exchange of Chicago (MidAm) offers corn 
and soybean future contracts in 1,000 bushel units along with smaller 
sized contracts for other coIIDilodities. In contrast, contracts on the 
CBT are traded only in 5,000 bushel units . The smaller sized MidAm 
contracts offer some potential advantages to smaller and medium size 
cash grain farms in their ability to spread out marketing and to more 
closely match sales on futures markets with expected production. However, 
to fully evaluate Mid.Am's marketing alternatives, grain producers need 
answers to a number of questions including the following: (1) How does 
the contract size affect the producers? (2) What is the relationship 
of Mid.Am prices to the CBT? (3) Are the rules and regulations of the Mid-
America CoI!Dilodity Exchange similar to the Chicago Board of Trade? and 
(4) Are brokerage services readily available for Mid.Am contracts outside 
of Chicago? This chapter is directed toward answering these questions . 
Mid.America Exchange 
The exchange was started in 1868 under the name of Pudd's Exchange. 
In 1880 it was incorporated as the Chicago Open Board of Trade. In 1973 
the exchange changed its name to the 11idAmerica Conunodi ty Exchange (12, 
p. 3). 
The Mid.America is current l y located at 175 Wes t Jackson Boulevard 
in Chicago, just across the s treet f rom t he Chicago Board of Trade. 
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Contracts traded on the Mid.Am are shown in Table 6-1. 
Table 6-1. Mid.Am's connnodities, size of contracts and trading months (13). 
Commodity 
Corn 
Wheat 
Soybeans 
Oats 
Live hogs 
Gold 
Silver 
Silver coins 
Contract Months Traded 
December, March, 
May, July, September 
July, September, 
December, March, May 
November, January, 
March, May, July, August, 
September 
July, September, December, 
March, May 
August, October, December, 
February, April, June, July 
January, March, May, July, 
September, November & Spot 
February, April, June, August, 
October, December & Spot 
(Inactive) 
Size of Contract 
1,000 bushels 
1,000 bushels 
1,000 bushels 
5,000 bushels 
15,000 pounds 
1 kilo (3215 
troy ounces) 
1,000 troy ounces 
$5,000 face value 
The minicontracts in recent years hav~ gained considerable popularitv 
with brokers and merchants. According to Mark Bruscke. Director of 
Economic Research of the MidAm, in 1975 there were between 24 and 36 
counnission merchants' branch offices dealing in MidAm contracts. Today 
he approximates there are 680 branch offices . 
Trading hours for the Mid.Am are Monday through Friday from 9:30 a.m. 
to 1:30 p.m. The Chicago Board of Trade also opens at 9:30 a.m. but 
closes at 1:15 p.m. The additional 15 minutes at the close of trading 
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allows MidAmerica traders to liquidate or establish positions after the 
Board of Trade has closed. In actuality, very few contracts are traded 
after 1:15 p.m. and very seldom does one see much price variation from 
1 the Board of Trade's last price or prices. 
The MidAmerica operates under the regulations of the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) as does the CBT (14, 15). The MidAm must 
operate under the same restrictions as the CBT. The CFTC was established 
by Congress in 1974 to strengthen the regulation of commodity trading 
and exchanges. 
The Mid.America Commodity Exchange trading rules are virtually the 
same as the Chicago Board of Trade Exchange rules for the individual 
commodities, except for the contract sizes, For example , the delivery 
2 
points and dates of delivery are the same for both exchanges . 
One important question that must be answered in evaluating the use of 
the MidAmerica for hedging pertains to commodity prices . How do the 
prices compare with the CBT prices during a given day ' s trading? Some 
discussion of the trading activities and the operation of the MidAm is 
necessary as a first step in answering this question . 
Each commodity has its own trading area within an over-all trading 
pit. Directly in front of the corn and soybean trading areas is an 
-------·---- -1 Based on personal observations of the author during visits to the 
MidAm and discussion with MidAm officials. 
2
conver sation with Mark Bruscke, Director of Economic Research at 
the MidAm. 
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electronic price quotation board displaying current prices at the CBT. 
The prices move along the board from right to left . For example, one 
might see "CZ 2.55" on the board which means that December (Z) corn 
(C) has just traded at the CBT for $2.55 per bushel . Prices from the 
CBT move along the pricing board randomly with each new quotation repre-
senting the latest trade for a particular coIIDllodity and futures contract . 
For example, December corn may be followed by July oats, August soybean 
meal, May wheat, back again with December corn, and November soybeans. 
Directly below the electronic price quotation board are individuals 
who record the CBT prices on blackboards. Traders can look at these 
blackboards and see the last trading prices for every futures contract 
month. 
Trader s may disagree as to which exchange actually discovers the 
price. The author's contention is that it is clearly trading at the CBT 
that discovers the prices and that MidAm prices tend to follow CBT 
11uot a ti.ons wi th a sli~h t time l ag . This can best be explained by an 
example: If November soybeans comes across the quotation board as selling 
f or $6 .00 at the CBT, then traders at the MidAm know that in fact 
November soybeans are worth $6.00 per bushel. If an individual trading 
on his own account at the MidAm feels that November beans are going 
higher, he will bid $6.00 and if he can ' t execute a contract at that 
price, he may bid $6 . 00 1/2, or $6 . 01 . If a contract is executed at $6.01 
and the next price quoted from the CBT is $5 . 99, the trader may begin 
to feel uneasy with his position. If the next price quote is $5.98, 
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then chances are he will sell out at a 3 cent loss. He knows most broker-
age customers would hesitate to pay $6.01 for beans when they can get them 
for $5 . 98 on the CBT. 
This means that individual traders on the Mid.Am are anticipating the 
next price quote from the CBT. As in the above example, if the Mid.Arn 
incorrectly anticipates the CBT's next price, when the next price quote 
comes MidAm traders quickly adjust their price to coincide with the CBT 
quotations. 
Another observation lending support to the contention that the CBT 
trading performs the price discovery function is that if trading is 
delayed at the CBT then trading at the Mid.Am is normally also delayed. 
If trading at the CBT is halted because of internal computer problems, 
trading is halted at the Mid.Am even though the MidAm is ready to trade. 
The settlement prices at the close of trading are exactly the same 
for both exchanges. The Mid.Am calls the CBT and sets its settlement 
prices exactly with the settlement prices of the CBT. 1 
Which exchange performs the price discovery function is not neces-
sarily important but it is imperative that the prices of the Mid.Am 
approximately coincide with the CBT. The CBT generally is considered 
the world pricing center for corn and soybeans. 
Another factor lending support to equal prices is the arbitrage 
phone at the Mid.Am. This is a direct line to the floor of the CBT. If 
I Conversation with Mark Bruscke, Director of Economic Research at 
the Mid.Am. 
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there is a wide price variation between the two exchanges , any of the 
MidAm traders could buy at one exchange and sell on the other to take 
advantage of the situation. For example, if December corn was selling at 
the MidAm for $2.50 and $2 .55 at the CBT, a trader could buy corn contracts 
at the MidAm and sell an equivalent amount at the CBT. The trader could 
then take delivery on the MidAm contracts and re-deliver on the CBT con-
tract at a 5¢ per bushel profit . One would expect this arbitrage process 
to insure that prices on the two exchanges are nearly identical. 
Analysis of MidArn-CBT Price Relationships 
Several price comparisons were made in this study to determine if 
corn and soybean prices are equal on the two exchanges . Before evaluating 
the results of price comparisons, it may be helpful to understand how the 
data were collected and evaluated. 1 
Each exchange has its own method of recording "time and sales" data. 
The purpose of the "time and sales" information is to have a history of 
the price of the commodity throughout each day's trading. Such records 
might show, for example, that on November 17 at 10:42:25, November beans 
sold for $5.23 1/4 on the MidAm Exchange . 
The CBT compiles its "time and sales" information at the end of the 
day and records the data as part of the permanent files of the CBT . Thus, 
information is available to the public to show exactly what price a partic-
ular counnodity was traded for at any particular time. 
1
section that follows was based on a visit to the two exchanges and 
discussion of record keeping procedures with exchange officials. 
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The MidAm's compilation of the "time and sales" is a manually 
recorded system. An individual stands at the front of the trading area 
and records the sales, bids, or offers on individual sheets of paper and 
time stamps the sheets. An example fo llows of MidAm "time and sales" 
record is shown in Figure 6-1 below. 
0 1 2 3 4 ~ 6 7 8 9 
C"·; 0 1 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1/8 1/4 3/ 8 yt' 5/ 8 3/4 7/ 8 
F H K N Q U X j. new 
w I 0 s -~ t -
B A F N IP L 
S~MfLE 
Figure 6.1 MidAmerica's "Time and Sales" sheets 
The Mid 'Am's "time and sales" sheet shows that on September 17, 1978, 
at 50 seconds past 11:13 a .m., that December (Z) corn (C) sold at .52 
1/2 oer bushel . The too two lines of the sheet represent only the cents at 
which a contract was executed. The dollar value is left off to expedite 
the recording . The dollar value can always be determined by published 
records in newspapers or from the CBT Statistical Annuals. 
Other important items in Figure 6-1 include the "B" and "A" on the 
last line. "B" stands for bid and "A" stands for asked. If the above 
example would have been a bid price then the "B" would have been slashed. 
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It shall be noted that during periods of rapidly changing prices and 
heavy trading volume, physical limitations of the individual doing the 
recording may prevent some price changes from being recorded. 
After sheets have been completed and time stamped, they are stacked 
together and become part of the permanent records of the MidAm. 
The author of t his paper selected certain trading days and went 
through the stacks of "time and sales" sheets to record the "time and 
sales" history for comparison with the CBT's "time and sales" sheets. 
Days with a substantial degree of price variability were selected 
for use in price comparisons. It was believed that in active markets, 
if the prices of the two exchanges were equal, then in slow markets, the 
prices would also be the identical . This is why more comparisons of 
soybeans were used . The data were obtained through a visit to the MidAm 
and CBT by the author. 
Before examining the results of the analysis, it should be recognized 
that slight time differences between the two exchanges may occur. That 
is, the clocks at both exchanges may not be the same down to the last 
second. The clock at the CBT may show that it is exactly 9 : 30 where the 
clock at the MidAm may show 9:30 . 20, 9:29.40 or 9:30 . 50 . Also, it takes 
a certain number of seconds for the recorder at the CBT to obtain the 
price quote, punch it on the computer, and send it out over the electronic 
price quotation board. Slight time lags may also be involved in the Mid-
Am record keeping process . 
For these reasons, time and price data were obtained for the MidAm 
and then compared to the CBT while allowing for a 1 minute interval on 
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both sides of the time recorded at the MidAm . If at 9:53.40 at the 
Mid.Am, November soybeans traded at $5.46 1/4, then prices at the CBT would 
be compared from 9:52 . 40 to 9:54.40 . If at any time during this interval 
the price of November soybeans at the CBT reached $5.46 1/4, then it was 
recorded that the prices at both exchanges were equal. Tables 6-2 and 
6-3 show the results from this analysis. 
As data in Table 6- 2 indicate, 90.1 percent of the time the price of 
soybeans at the Mid.Am and the CBT were exactly equivalent within the one 
minute time interval. If one includes the percentage of time the prices 
were equal or differed by no more than one-half cent per bushel, the 
percentage would increase to 98.3. Of 1,604 price comparisons between 
the two exchanges, only 10 trades varied by more than 1 cent. 
Table 6-3 shows corn prices at the two exchanges were exactly equal 
84.3 percent of the time, using the one minute trading interval. If 
one allows for a 1/4 cent variation, the percentage jumps to 99.4 percent. 
Only two trades out of 319 were executed at the Mid.Am with over a 1/4¢ 
price variation from the CBT on the days studied. 
One would expect a greater difference between soybean prices on the 
two exchanges than on corn because of the higher soybean price and 
typically wider fluctuations of prices of that conunodity . Prices on beans 
are more likely to change by 1/2¢ to 1¢ during a short period of time 
whereas corn prices have tended to be somewhat more stable. 
These results indicate that the prices at both exchanges have been 
nearly equal on the days studied and should be within an acceptable range 
of variation for producer hedging decisions. 
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If one looks at the distant soybean contracts or contracts that are 
approximately four months or more from expiration, one finds that eight 
price comparisons out of 372 or 2. 2 percent of the comparisons differed 
by le or more. This indicates that the distant future contracts at the 
MidAm usually are equivalent to those same contracts at the CBT. 
Since the data examined here indicate prices are equivalent or nearly 
equivalent at the MidAm and the CBT, let us examine possible flexibility 
to individual producers that might be available through Mid.Am contracts . 
The major difference in contracts, as noted earlier, is that Mid.Am offers 
1,000 bushel grain contracts as opposed to the CBT's 5,000 bushel con-
tracts on corn and soybeans . 
Consider a producer raising 200 acres of soybeans averaging 40 bushels 
per acre . This producer will have 8,000 bushels of soybeans to market. 
If he should choose to hedge on the CBT, he could sell only one contract 
(S,000 bushels). Sales of more than one contract would involve specu-
lation on a portion of his crop and would increase price risk. If, 
however, he utilized the MidAm, he could hedge up to eight different 
contracts (8,000 bushels) at eight different prices. 
The potential flexibility of the 1,000 bushel contract can be illus-
trated by the following examples of hedging. Using the above farm 
situation, only 5,000 of the 8,000 bushels of beans will be marketed, 
that is, either one contract on the CBT or five contracts on the Mid.Am 
will be utilized. Prices occurring in 1977 will be used in the example 
with November beans as the contract month . 
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On March 17, 1977, November soybeans traded at $7.15. With a normal 
local basis of $.50, the producer would have been able to "lock in" 
roughly $6.65 per bushel for harvest delivery of soybeans. The producer 
must ask himself if he is satisfied with this price . Keeping in mind 
that he can hedge only one contract on the CBT, let's say the farmer was 
satisfied with the price and sold one November contract on the CBT. The 
producer would have locked himself into 5,000 bushels of beans at $6.65. 
Certainly that was not a bad price, but what could have been the result 
if he had spread out his hedging using the 1,000 bushel contracts of the 
Mid.Am? 
If the producer had used the MidAm, he could have sold only one 
contract initially, leaving 4,000 bushels yet to market. The following 
table shows five possible trades that could have been made on the MidAm, 
using a technique of spreading out marketings on a rising market. 
Table 6-4. Expected price for hedging five contracts on the Mid.Am 
Contract Contract Expected Expected 
Date Month Price Price Price 
March 17, 1977 Nov. $7 .15 $.50 $6.65 
April 18, 1977 Nov. 7.70 .50 7.20 
May 24, 1977 Nov. 7.55 .50 7.05 
June 6, 1977 Nov. 7.90 .50 7.40 
June 29, 1977 Nov. 7.08 .50 6.58 
Average local price expected per bushel $6 . 97 
One can see that by using the MidAm, the producer would have received 
$6.97 per bushel or $1600.00 more than the $6.65 per bushel from the CBT. 
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One of the major advantages of spreading out sales is that funda-
mental supply and demand information on the new crop can be evaluated as 
time progresses. In May, one can look at the planting progress, weather 
conditions, export demand, and domestic crush . If record crops appear 
likely, one can hedge immediately. If demand appears to be strong, then 
the producer may want to delay some sales. By late June, one has a better 
idea of the potential size of the crop and may be able to evaluate full 
price prospects more closely. 
If one now compares the potential price received from hedging on the 
MidAm ($6.97) in 1977 to the cash market during October and November, 
one can see the potential use and profits from hedging. The best cash 
price at local North Central Iowa elevators for beans in October or 
November of 1977 was $5.70 per bushel. This is $1.27 per bushel less or 
$6,350 less than by using the above hedging procedures. Granted, not all 
years are as favorable as 1977 for hedging, but it does illustrate the 
added flexibility of the smaller MidAm contracts for hedging. 
The brokerage commissions vary between the MidAm and CBT. R. G. 
Dickinson and Company of Ames charges $20 per 1,000 bushel MidAm corn 
contract and $22.50 for a MidAm soybeancontract, whereas they charge $45 
for a 5,000 bushel CBT corn contract and $60 for a CBT soybean contract. 
Therefore, hedging corn on the MidArn will cost $.02 per bushel whereas 
at the CBT, the costs are $ .009 per bushel. Hedging soybeans at the 
MidAm will cost $.0225 per bushel or $.012 at the CBT. In other words, 
hedging costs on the MidAm are approximately twice that of the CBT. How-
ever, these additional nominal costs should not discourage one from using 
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the MidAm. 
The volume of trading at the Mid.Am is also an important consideration 
in appraising its usefulness as a hedging market. If the volume of trading 
is low at the MidAm, traders might possibly experience difficulty in 
executing a contract . For the MidAm to be an acceptable alternative to 
the Chicago Board of Trade, volume of trading must be adequate for traders 
to be able to execute a trade at the price the market has discovered. 
Table 6-5 shows the number of contracts of corn and soybeans traded 
at the MidAm and CBT for the last five years. 
Table 6-5. a Number of contracts traded at the MidAm and CTB (3, p . 5) 
from 1973 through 1977. 
Corn Contracts Solbean Contracts 
Mid.Am CBT Percent Mid.Am CBT Percent 
1977 280,268 5,021,827 6 1,104,763 7,996,139 14 
1976 418, 715 4,609,259 9 700,466 5,474,179 13 
1975 802,173 4,839,048 17 657,132 3 , 913,390 17 
1974 760,521 4,679,042 16 557,348 2,731,297 20 
1973 512,855 4,074,835 13 282,732 2,742,306 10 
aConversation with Mark Bruscke, Director of Economic Research of 
the Mid.America Conunodity Exchange on September 7, 1978. 
One can see that the number of contracts traded at the MidAm for the 
last five years ranged from 6 percent to 17 percent of the volume at the 
CBT. Soybeans ranged from 10 percent to 20 percent of the volume at the 
CBT. 
There is no exact formula that can be used to determine whether Mid-
Am does have adequate volume to ensure execution of a marke t order. 
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However, it is the author's belief that these volume of trading data 
combined with the analysis of the CBT vs. the MidAm, prices indicate 
trading volume should be adequate the majority of the time to insure that 
MidAm market orders can be executed. 
78 
CHAPTER VII. 
SUMMARY 
Use of the futures market can be a valuable marketing tool for the 
Iowa producer. To understand and use the futures market, one must 
understand the term basis. The basi s is the difference of the local 
cash grain price from the futures price . 
The yearly basis for a given location shows a def i nite pattern from 
year to year. If one knows these patterns and what affects the basis, 
one can make better marketing decisions . 
Hedging 
A major advantage of hedging one's crop in the futures market is 
the reduction of price risks. Price risks are reduced by selling futu r es 
contracts for a portion of the crop before the producer is ready to 
physically market the grain or soybeans. If prices decline later, the 
money lost by a drop in the cash market would be approximat ely offset 
by a gain in the value of the fu t ures position. The opposite situation 
would be true if prices rose after the producer had placed his hedge. 
Thus, hedging provides price stability and risk reduction . 
Storage Hedge 
The storage hedge, selling July futures during harvest and buying 
back the futures during sunnner and selling the cash grain simultaneously, 
can be an effective marketing tool. One formula for estimating the 
potent ial return on a storage hedge is as follows: 
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R = B -B BE - HC 
R = return for storage 
BB = beginning basis when the storage hedge is initiated 
BE expected ending basis is initiated 
expected ending basis is terminated 
HC = expected hedging costs inc luding brokerage fee, interest on 
margin money and grain inventory, drying and shrinkage cost 
Referring to Figure 4-2 through 4-9, one can see a very definite 
pattern of the widest basis occurring during harves t time and narrowing 
into the summer. The optimum return is to sell the futures when the basis 
is widest and to buy back the futures when the basis narrows. 
Table 4-2 shows that in the past four year s , the average storage 
hedge for corn would have been more profitable than by selling directly 
on the cash market while soybeans showed a greater return by selling 
the unhedged cash crop during the summer months. 
Despite lower average returns from hedging soybeans . the year 
to year fluctuation in hedging returns was substantially smaller than 
from storing unhedged soybeans . Thus, storage hedges have offered an 
opportunity to reduce soybean price risks although routine use of this 
tool in the past four year s would have involved some sacrifice of income 
by the producer. For corn, routine s torage hedging during this period 
would have both i ncreased average returns and reduced year to year flue-
tuations in producer returns. 
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New Crop Bids 
The new crop bids generally become available around July 1 and 
reflect the pr ice elevators are willing to pay for harvest delivery of 
crops that are currently growing in the field . 
Data for 1976 and 1977 indicate a slightly greter return for hedging 
or using the cash market than for accepting a new crop bid. The data, 
however, reflects only two years of prices. Additional years of data 
are needed for conclusive evidence. 
Delivery Costs 
The delivery costs are all the costs of moving grain from a specific 
location t o an authorized warehouse in Chicago. The delivery costs should 
then serve as a benchmark for establishing the lower end of the basis. 
That is, if corn futures are $2 .45 per bushel and delivery costs are $ . 45 
per bushel from Mason City, the cash price should be $2.00 per bushel 
or more. 
If the basis is more than the delivery costs, there is incentive for 
the producer or elevator to deliver on a contract which then puts pressure 
on the basis and delivery costs to come together. 
In 1977, the corn basis during the last four weeks of each tenninating 
futures contract was never wider than the delivery costs and only twice 
out of 26 weeks was the soybean basis wider than the delivery costs. 
Thus, in 1977, it was to the producer's advantage to sell grain on the 
cash market and liquidate the futures position rather than to deliver 
gain on futures contracts. 
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MidAmerica Commodity Exchange 
The MidAm offers corn and soybeans futures contracts in 1,000 bushel 
units, whereas the CBT offers only 5,000 bushel units. The smaller sized 
MidAm contracts offer additional flexibility to the producer if the MidAm 
and CBT contracts are otherwise equivalent . 
The author believes the Mid.Am is a viable alternative to the CBT. 
The prices of the MidAm and CBT are equivalent and the volume appears 
to be adequate to insure contract execution. 
The additional flexibility and contract size of the MidAm could 
bring hedging to the small producer which was otherwise not available to 
him. 
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